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Introductory  address  by  Mr!  Frans 
the  Commission,  to  the  European  Democrats 
Copenhagen,  5  May  1982 
It is  a  great pleasure  for  me  to  be  with  you  here  today~ 
I  welcome  this  opportunity of having  a  more  informal 
exchange  of views  and  the  subject you  have  chosen  lends 
itself particularly well  to  this. 
Before  dealing  in some  detail with  develop'inents  in relations 
between  the  Commission  and  Parliament let me  first place 
them  iri 'a width  context  :  ~hese relations,after all,  cannot 
be  judged  in isolation  ;  they  are part of the  wider 
network  of relations  between  the  Commission,  Parliament  and 
the  Council.  And_we  are ·all  only  too  well  aware  that  the 
functioning,  or rather non-functioning,  of  the  Council  plays  • 
an  important part here .  .. 
In this  company  I  know  that  I  can dispense  with  the  usual 
analysis  of  the  Communitysdecision~making process. 
It is abundantly clear  that it leaves  a lot to  be  desired, 
as  the  immobilism  of  recent  years  has  demonstrated.  This 
has  not  only  eroded  the, Community's  ability, to  take  decisions, 
but has  also upset  the  institutional  ba~ance provided  for 
in the Treaties. 
~  The  main  reason  for  ~ -------
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The  main  reason for  the present  imbalance  is the  growing 
influence  of  intergovernmental  elements  in the decision-
A> 
making  process.  It is reflected in the  Council's  insistence 
on unanimity  and  its reluctance  to delegate  important 
administrative  and managerial  functions  to  the  Commiss~on. 
Any  of you  who  would  like  to  know  more  about  the 
Commission's  thinking  on  these  two points  should  look  at 
part  two  of our. report  on  inter-institut:onal relations,  .·  .....  ,. 
published last October. 
• 
I  only mention  this because  I  feel  that,  however  useful  and 
necessary  an  improvement  of Parliament's position vis a vis 
the  Commission may  be,  it must  not  be  allowed  to  aggravate 
the present  institutional imbalance. 
To  my  mind  a'  return  to  more  "communautaire  "  decision-making  .. 
within the  Council  has  always  been  a  prerequisite for 
improved  func'tioning  of both.the  Commission  and  Parliament. 
The  stronger ~he intergovernmental  element  in Council 
decision-making,  the harder it is  for  Parliament  to  exercise 
democratic  control. 
I  think  I  can safely say  that  the  relationship between 
Parliament  and  the  Commission  has  become  more  political 
since direct elections.  Political contacts  between  the  two 
institutions have  been  -
.. - 3  -
institutions have  been  intensified,  and  there  is no  doubt 
that  the  Commission  takes more  notice  than it used  to  of 
Parliament's  views  and  opinions. 
In  committee  and  in plenary session dialogue  between  the 
Commission  and  Parliament  is  increasingly active,  in form 
and  in substance.  The  Commission pointed this  out 
during  the July debate  last  year~  and  we  said it again in 
our October  report  . 
.......  ~  .•.  -~  .,: 
The  changes  you  have  made  to your  Rules  of Procedure  have 
• 
more  or  less  focused  us  into a  process  of political 
conciliation within  the wider  framework  of Parliament's  con-
sultative role.  This  has  made  us  change  our original·proposal 
in  a  number  of case?. 
This  demon~trates that it is perfectly feasible  for  Parliament 
to use  the  Commission  as  a  lever  to  ga1n more  influence  over 
the  legislative process.  - ./ 
,· 
. ' 
Where  Parliament's  influence  is  limited, _it  is of the  utmost 
'·.  importance,  in my  view,  that  the  general  level  of debates  . 
and  the.content of resolutions  adopted  should  clearly 
reflect Parliament's  constancy of purpose  and  consistency 
of judgement. 
The  slimmer  one's  powers,  the  more.  convincing  one's  arguments 
must· be.  And  I  hope- you  won't  mind  my  saying  that Parliament 
- does  not  always  come  -4
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does  not  always  come  up  to  standard.  The  recent  opinion 
on  farm prices was  totally incoherent.  I  am  quite  sure 
that adoption of that resolution Jlas  done  nothing  to  improve 
Parliament.' s  image. 
The  central question in the  institutional debate  is  : 
how  can  Parliament  gain more  influence  over  the  Community 
decision-making process.  But  the problem is that the 
institutional imbalance  and  intrusion ot  the  intergouverne-
mental  element·~~~e made  it even more  difficult for 
Parliament  to get  a  grip  on  the  Community's  supreme  decision-
• 
making  body,  the  Council. 
This  is why  it is  so  important  to pressure  the  Council  into 
taking part in the  debate.  This  is why  inter-institutional 
agreements  are  attractive  ;they force  the  Council  to put 
its cards  on  the  table. 
,. 
Why  do  you  think we·submitted  a  proposal  to  improve  and 
extend  the  le?i~lative conciliation procedure  ?  Why  do 
you  think we  insisted from  the  outset  that  the  proposal 
be  discussed  on  a  tripartite basis  ? 
;· 
So  far  our efforts have  been  in vain.  Indeed,  I  am  rather 
·puzzled at Parliament's  failure  to  take  ~ction itself to  get 
talks  going. 
-fhe  conciliation procedure  is  -- 5  -
The  conciliation procedure  is quite  important.  It is, 
after all,  a  first step  towards  shared  legislative power?..· 
Last week,  in the  House,  I  announced  and  explained  s~me 
concTete proposals  concerning  international agreements. 
Today,  the  Commission  is sending  a  communication  on  the 
subject  to  Parliament  and  Council.  Here  again,  the  Council 
is being  drawn  into  the  institutional debate. 
It is  important  to get  a  tripartite  di~l• gue  going  in thi$ 
..  ~ "  •...  ·~  .;: 
area too,  to get  the. cards  on  the  table  that much  sooner • 
• 
There  s~ems to·  b.e  a  fair  chance  of this tripartite approach 
bearing fruit in at  least one  field in the  near  future. 
I  am  thinking,  of course,of conciliation.  If all goes  well, 
we  should·have  an  qgreement  on  the  classification of 
expenditure  by  mid-June . 
.. 
Let  me  return now  to relations  between  the  Commission  and 
Parliament. 
There  have  been  a  number  of  improvement~.  The  Commission  has 
become  more  receptive  to political signals  from  Parliament  : 
it is more  willing to  respond  to  Parliament'J initiatives  ; 
and it is more  prepared  to  supply  information to  Parliament, 
partly to  make  it easier for  Parliament  to exercise democrati 
control. 
- This  brings .me  to  the  -6 This  brings  me  to the  debate  on  follow-up  action on 
Parliament's  resolutions  and  opinions,  one  of the  procedures 
which  make  it easier for  you  to  ex~cise democratic  control. 
As  far _as  the Commission  is concerned we  could provide  direct  . 
actual  information and  bi-annual view  of  the  follow-up 
of Parliamentary resolutions. 
Parliament  - and your  Group  - claims  that this procedure 
needs  to be  impro~·ed.  I  agree entirely. 
At  present  the procedure suffers  from  two  major  defects  : 
the  range  pf subj  ~cts which ·can  be  raised needs  to result  in 
,  long  debates  which  are  short  on quality.  The  Commissioner 
holding  the portfolio is unable  to  attend more  often  than 
not  and  the  lack of  ~dequate preparation does  nothing  to 
improve  the  quality of the  debate. 
I  think it would ··be  a  good  idea if debates  in plenary 
session were  confined·to formulating  opinions  in the  context 
of Parliament's  cpnsultative role  and  perhaps  to  the  last 
two  sittings. 
The  foll~w-up to opinions  and own-initiative resolutions 
would  probably  be  best dealt with  by  the  appropriate  Committee. 
This  would  mean  that matters  could  be  discussed  in  the 
presence  of  the  Commissioner holding  the portfolio. 
This  would  not  exclude  the  possibility of.certain matters 
finding  their way  to  the  plenary  session via the  committees. 
These  are  just a  few  -
.. 7 These  are  just a  few  suggestions,  which  I  intend  to raise 
with  Parliament's  Bureau  in the  near 'future. 
Commissioners  are  more  than willing  to  attend meetings 
of Parliament's  committees  and  explain  the  Commission's 
Y  policy and  actions.  We  are  also prepared  to  facilit~t~ 
discussing within these  committees  by  supplying briefs 
and  the  like beforehand.  It would  obviously helpful if 
committees  could stick  to  their agendas .and notify members 
when  a  Commission:e·F  plans  to  appear,  thereby ensuring 
reasonable  attendance.  You  ~now as  weil  as·I do  that 
agendas  are  frequently  changed  and  that  attend~nce is 
often poor.  Given  its steady  flow  of criticism the 
Commission  from  Parliament,  I  trus  you  t•dll  take it in 
good  part is we  criticise Parliament's  modus  operandi 
from  time  to  tim~. 
Your  rightly  att.~ches great  importance  tq 'the  Commission 
being given  adminis tr.a ti  ve  and  manageri~<J. responsibilities. 
~ i 
The  fact  of the ~atter is  that· the  Council,  an  unwieldi,  al-
most  intergover~mental body,  is hanging  on  to all kinds  of 
e~ecutive powers  which  would  be  better and  more  efficiently 
exercised by  the  Commission. 
1  believe  that  far  greater use  should  be  made  of  the  last 
indent  of Article  155  of  the  EEC  Treaty. 
- In practice,  however,  the  -8
-- u  --
I  believe,  however,  the  Council  is extremely reluctant  to 
delegate powers.  And  if it finally does  decide  to do  so, 
it attaches all sorts of strings  iD  the  form  of supervision 
by  the  ~fember States. 
My  mvn  impression is that the  real problem is obstruction 
at staff level within the  Council,  rather than  a  lack of 
political will  on  the part of the ministers. 
Civil  servants,  almost  by definition,  are  reluctant  to 
relinquish authority,  and ministers  do  not  always  know 
•  their way.around  the  Charlemagne's  labyrinthine bureaucracy. 
And  talking of bureaucracy  - or rather Eurocracy  - its main 
strongholds  are  the  European departments  of national  admini-
strations which  have  come  to power  thanks  to  the  Community. 
\\There  the  Commis"sion  has  been  given executive powers,  it 
makes  full uses  of  them.  You  only  have  to  look  at market 
"".•" 
and price  poli~y.in agriculture,  competition,  coal  and  steel 
many  other  examples  I  could quote. 
To  put  ~t in a  nutshell,  the  problem is not  the  optimal  use 
of existing powers,  but  the  reluctance  to  grant new  ones. 
The  Commission  is assisted in its executfve  function  by 
so-called management  committees.  In  some  areas  - for  instance 
agriculture  - everyone  is satisfied with-this  arrangement, 
as  I- am  sure Sir Henry  PLUMB  will  agree. 
- Problems  arise when  attempts  -
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Problems  arise when  attempts  are  made  to curtail  the 
Commission's  executive  responsibilities,  in relation to 
harmonization of legislation for  instance,  or  food  aid.  .  . 
There  is nothing intrinsically wrong  with  the  Commission 
keeping  in  touch. with what  goes  on  in diffierent sectors. 
But  the  really important  thing  - for Parliament's  supervi-
sory role  too  - is to  ensure· that  the  decision-making process 
remains  clear and  unambiguous,  and  that- responsibilities 
are  clearly defi~ea  • 
Your  Group  has  asked  the  Commission  to produce· an  action 
- programma  for making  full  use  of existing powers.  You  will 
have  realized  from  what  I  have  just said,  that  the  problem 
is not  really one  of existing executive  powerd. 
What  we  real,ly  need  now  is  for  the  institutions,  particularly 
the  Council,  to -·agree  on  an  action programma  in which  each 
institution would have  a  specific role  and  specific 
responsibilities • 
You  will  find  suggestions  for  a  programme  along  these  lines 
in our  May  Mandate  proposals,  on  which'.the  Council  has  so 
far  failed  to act. 
The  Commission  has  now  produced  a  supplementary programme, 
which  concentrates  on  employment,  invest~ent and  strengthening 
of the  E.M.S. 
No  matter how  you  look at it -
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No  matter how  you  look at  it~ you  always  come  back  to  the 
. 
same  point  :  we  need  a  measure  of political commitment  from 
the  Council.  On  this  the  Commission  and  Parliament  are  allies  .  ... 
I  would  like to  conclude,  Mr.  Chairman,  with  a  few  words 
about  the  general political and  institutional situation: 
The  present institutional debate  is  ranging  far  beyond 
improvements  that might  be  made  ~ithin the  context of the 
existing Treaties.  Take,  for  instance,  t• e  work  now  being 
done  by  your  Inst'ittitional Affairs  Commit  ee. 
Nor  is  the  debate  confined  to  Parliament .. The  Ruropean  Act, 
.  ' 
1  ,  proposed  by Mr.  Genscher  and  Mr.  Colombo,  has  been under 
discussion in the  Council  for  some  time. 
·As  you  know,  the main points  of this proposal  are  a  "rapproche-
ment"  between  the political cooperation  and  Community 
apparatus,  a  Community  foreign policy,  a  European  approach 
to security,  the  extention of European  c6oper~tion to  new 
~·"' 
areas,  such  as  culture  and  justice,  and  a  number  of suggestions 
about  the  functioning  of the  institutions  in general  and 
Parliament  in particular. 
The  advantage  of the  parliamentary  approach  to· the  debate 
ori  institutional renewal  is that is is public. 
-I am  less  than·happy  that the-- 11  -
I  am  less  than happy  that  the draft  European Act  is being 
worked  on  by  the  Council,  in the  backroom of political 
cooperation.  I  am  afraid that,  in the  end,  all attempts 
at renewal will be  swept  under  the  carpet,  leaving us  with 
a  sterile document  full of official platitudes. 
I  would  deplore  such  a  development.  The  Genscher-Colombo 
proposal has  at least given fresh  impetus  to  the  institutional 
debate.  It could also be  a  first step  towards  a  broadening 
of Europe's  poli~ical base. 
• 
One  final·remark,  Mr.  Chairman. 
Institutional  renewal  is certainly desirable  and  necessary. 
But  the  debate  must not  be  used  as  an  excuse  for  avoiding 
policy decisions. 
The  two  must  go  h~nd.in hand • 
.. . 